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Abstract: 
Within a compensating wage differential framework we investigate whether there is a wage premium 
for working in a pollution intensive industry.  Our results for the economy as a whole suggest a small 
wage premium of approximately one quarter of one percent associated with the risk of working in a 
dirty job.  This premium rises to over fifteen percent for those individuals who work in one of the 
five dirtiest industries.  We also find evidence of a fatal risk wage premium, providing estimates of 
the value of a statistical life of between £12 million and £19 million (2000 prices). 
 
Keywords: Compensating Wage Differentials, Pollution, Value of Statistical Life. 
JEL: J28, J31, Q52. 
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In recent years environmental concerns have crept up the political agenda.  Alongside the 
recognition of how economic activity affects climate change there is also an increase in the awareness 
of how industrial emissions of a variety of pollutants can adversely the health of employees.  Indeed, 
the recent Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals law (REACH), one of the largest 
EU laws ever ratified, oversees the registration of around 30,000 chemicals and provides an EU body 
with the power to ban those chemicals that are deemed a health threat.  According to Vineis and 
Simonato (1991), between 1 and 40% of lung cancers and 0 to 24% of bladder cancers are 
attributable to workplace exposure.  Similarly, Landrigan (1992) estimates that in the US between 
50,000 and 70,000 cancer deaths in 1990 were caused by work related toxic exposure together with 
350,000 new cases of illness.  Finally, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimate that 200,000 
people die globally, each year, from cancer related to their workplace (WHO 2007). 
 
Given these health concerns, in this paper we ask whether workers are compensated financially for 
working in a heavily polluting or dirty industry. We define ‘dirty’ as an industrial environment where 
an employee is potentially exposed to a high level of pollutants that may, in turn, have a detrimental 
effect on that individual’s health.  If there is a positive probability that an individual will suffer a long 
or short-term illness, or possibly death, from working in a dirty industry then taking such a job can 
be considered a form of risk-taking behaviour.  As such, workers in dirty industries should be fully 
compensated for the risks.  An alternative way of thinking about this is that firms pollute the local 
environment and hence workers from the locality demand higher wages as compensation irrespective 
of work exposure levels.  Thus it should be possible to calculate the wage premium associated with 
such employment by using a traditional hedonic wage methodology.  
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The theoretical case for efficient wage compensation rests on the following assumptions: workers are 
fully informed of the risks of working in a dirty job; they have utility functions where the expected 
likelihood and costs of exposure to harmful emissions and other occupational hazards enter as 
arguments; if firms possess information on workers’ preferences and expectations; if a pollution-free 
working environment is costly to provide; and labor markets are perfectly competitive.  If any of 
these conditions fail to fully apply then the actual compensation may be less than utility offsetting or 
nonexistent.  Conversely, compensation can be more than utility offsetting if workers overestimate 
the risk. Therefore, whether pollution exposure will result in a compensating wage differential is 
essentially an empirical question.2 
 
The contribution of this paper is to provide the first estimates of the wage premia associated with 
pollution risk.  We use disaggregated industry-level pollution data and individual-level wages and 
characteristics.  In addition we provide estimates of the value of statistical life (VSL) for the UK and 
the first estimates employing data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The main finding of 
our paper is the existence of a positive and significant wage premium attached to working in a dirty 
                                               
2 A lively debate on the existence of wage compensation continues.  See Dorman (1996) for a broader discussion of these 
assumptions and theoretical reasons for doubting their applicability. Most value of statistical life (VSL) studies centre on 
one basic premise: that the VSL should roughly correspond to the value that people place on their lives in private 
decisions.  See Viscusi (1993), Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review of the existing 
literature and Mrozek and Taylor (1999) for the results of an often cited meta-analysis on the determinants of the value 
of life.  Mrozek and Taylor (1999) offer a best practice estimate of VSL of $2million (1998 prices).  Note that their 
estimates are considerably less than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) VSL value of $6 million (1998 dollars).  
Burtraw et al. (1998), Hagler-Bailly (1995) and USEPA (1997) all show that the benefits far outweigh the abatement costs 
even if VSL figures were to be reduced by two thirds.  See Viscusi (2007) for an overview of the regulation of health, 
safety and environmental risks 
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industry, across a range of pollution exposure measures.  This finding is robust to a battery of 
sensitivity checks. The average weekly wage premium across all industries is found to be between 
£0.20 and £0.80 equivalent to between 0.1% and 0.4% of weekly wages. For the most pollution 
intensive industries the weekly wage premium is between £17.40 and £125.90, equivalent to between 
6.5% and 30.0%. A secondary result is that we also find evidence of a weekly wage premium 
compensating for the risk of fatal accidents. Across all industries, this premium is between £1.30 and 
£1.50 per week, equivalent to between 0.54% and 0.63% of weekly wages. Finally, our fatal risk 
results provide estimates of the VSL of between £12m and £19m in 2000 prices, although we find 
no significant value of statistical injury.3    
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1 reviews the literature on the impact of 
pollution on health and also examines the wage-risk literature to identify the difficulties associated 
with estimating compensating wage differentials; Section 2 outlines our methodology and describes 
our data; Section 3 presents our results while Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. Review of the Literature 
 
Little has been written on the impact of industrial pollution on wages.  In this section we discuss the 
relationship between wages, job risk and pollution.  First, we briefly discuss how pollution can affect 
an individual’s health and thus the riskiness of working in a given industry.  Second, we consider the 
                                               
3 UK estimates of VSL have often been notably different to those estimated for the US (see Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  
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factors that may hinder the estimation of pollution related wage-premia and conclude with a brief 
discussion of pollution risk within the context of the inter-industry wage differential literature.4 
 
Our first consideration is the link between pollution and health.  The effects of ozone and Particulate 
Matter (PM10) on health are those most commonly studied because it is these substances that most 
frequently exceed air quality guidelines (Cesar et al. 1999).  The health risks due to air pollution 
(specifically ozone and PM10) are quantified by estimating the relationship between the incidence of 
adverse health effects and air quality.  A number of quantitative estimates of exposure-response 
relations of known health effects from various cities have been pooled together (meta-analysis).  The 
findings are that air pollutants can affect health in a number of ways, including eye irritations, 
respiratory diseases, cardiovascular effects and premature death.5  
 
                                               
4 There are a small number of studies that have examined the impact of environmental regulations on employment 
although they generally find little effect.  For the US, studies by Morgenstern et al. (2002) and Berman and Bui (2001) find 
no evidence to suggest that regulations have adversely affected industrial employment with the former actually finding 
weak evidence that regulations may result in a small net increase in employment.  Cole and Elliott (2007) find a similar 
result for the UK.  However, studies by Henderson (1996), Kahn (1997) and Greenstone (2002), again for the US, 
indicate that industries located in counties with stringent regulations have experienced job losses, or at the very least, 
lower employment growth rates, relative to industries in less regulated counties. 
5 Ozone pollution stems mainly from emissions of Nox and VOC’s with concentration levels depending on the amount 
and location of emitted pollutants, geographical characteristics, meterorological conditions, and atmospheric chemistry 
and transport.  Ozone formation is complicated and non-linear, for example, under certain conditions an increase in Nox 
can reduce ozone concentrations.  PM10 pollution stems mainly from direct emissions of particles, and from reactions of 
NOX and SO2 with other substances in the atmosphere.  Potential emission sources are building and construction, diesel 
trucks and buses, forest fires, refuse burning and some manufacturing industries.  See Cesar et al. (2001) for details. 
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The adverse effects of air pollution are related to the rate at which lung tissue ages and can 
contribute to chronic lung and cardiovascular disease.  Short-term peaks in air pollution (and hence 
acute exposure) can affect people in weakened states (such as those with pneumonia or asthma) and 
can lead to premature death.  Dockery et al. (1993) and Pope et al. (1995) are two studies that follow a 
cross-section of individuals across time and measure both the exposure to air pollution and other 
factors that may lead to premature death.  These studies calculate survival functions (the probability 
that a person survives to each age in a given community) and find that pollution results in the loss of 
a significant number of life-years. 
 
A final consideration is that although a significant amount of information is available on the effect 
on health of asbestos, vinyl cloride, coke emissions, benzene, arsenic, cotton dust, acrylonitrile, lead 
and ethylene oxide, not a great deal is known about whether the many chemicals that workers are 
exposed to at work are cancer-causing and whether or not threshold effects exist.  According to the 
WHO, the most common types of occupational cancers are lung cancer, mesothelioma and bladder 
cancer with every tenth lung cancer death being closely associated to risks in the workplace.   In a 
recent WHO press release to mark World Day for Safety and Health at Work they write “Currently, 
most cancer deaths caused by occupational risk factors occur in the developed world.  This is a result 
of the wide use of different carcinogenic substances such as blue asbestos, 2-napthylamine and 
benzene 20-30 years ago”.  A scientific literature is emerging on the long-term effects of chemicals, 
but as many of the effects may take many years to become apparent, and since it might be 
combinations of chemicals that result in synergistic effects, considerable difficulties arise in locating 
carcinogens (Kostiuk 1990). 
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In many cases, exposure to workplace pollutants would be obvious to the worker. Some chemicals 
have distinctive smells (e.g. sulfur) or would result in a loss of local visibility (e.g. particulate matter), 
while others would be evident because of their impact in causing eye irritation or tightness of breath. 
However, the presence of some pollutants would be less evident, particularly those that are odourless 
and cause only longer term health problems. There is only a small literature that discusses an 
individual’s perceived pollution risk and hence the likelihood that an individual would demand a 
wage premium.  There are several primary reasons why “dirty” wage premia may be difficult to 
identify empirically. 
 
The first reason is a lack of knowledge by employers or employees, and the public, on the impact of 
pollution on health and disease (or a lack of awareness of the existence of pollution).  This in turn 
may undermine the market’s ability to generate compensating wage differentials.  Shilling and 
Brackbill (1979) estimate that only about 5% of workers were fully informed of the job hazards of 
their occupations.  In a related study, Brown (1987) interviewed workers in dangerous chemical 
plants and concluded that, although workers were fully aware of the risks that they faced, they 
employ a psychological defence mechanism of denial by refusing to believe that the probability of 
death or serious injury is high.  This is less of a concern in this paper, as we do not use self-reported 
risk. However, in contrast, Viscusi and O’Connor (1984) find that US chemical workers are aware of 
the risks to which they are exposed and received compensating wage differentials comparable to 
those found for objective risk measures.  
 
A second consideration is that health problems (or indeed nonfatal injuries) may be compensated ex-
post.  Hence dirty or risky jobs have to be only partly compensated ex-ante through higher wages due 
to the presence of worker compensation benefits that may be written into a worker’s contract.  For 
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example, retirement, pensions, training, vacation pay etc.  Lott and Manning (2000) and Wiggins and 
Ringleb (1992) examine this issue from a legal standpoint and show that allowing employees to sue 
their employer has resulted in firms reorganizing and divesting themselves of hazardous facilities in 
the hope of gaining protection from potential law suites.   
 
Third, it can be argued that individuals’ perceptions of risk are heterogeneous so, for example, ethnic 
minorities and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds may have different perceptions of risk 
or at least be less geographically mobile and hence have fewer alternative employment options 
(Viscusi 2003).  Leeth and Ruser (2003) include sex and ethnic dummies to address Viscusi’s (1993) 
point on possible risk preference differences across sex and ethnicity.  It is also possible that wage 
premia will differ with age as older workers, with a shorter discounted expected future, are risking 
less of their life.   In a US study, Leeth and Ruser (2003) find that both workplace fatalities and 
injuries are higher for men than women and for blacks and Hispanics than for whites and other 
minorities.  Variation in risk preference among groups, perhaps caused by income, family 
background or social norms may produce differences in risk. 6  However, once the occupational 
                                               
6 In a study for the US Viscusi (2003) reveals that blacks do face a higher fatality risk and nonfatal injury-risk but that the 
differences are not great.  He also shows that black employees receive significant premia for nonfatal risks.  The problem, 
however, is that although black employees undertake greater risk than whites, they also receive lower annual pay.  Viscusi 
(2003) states that “…there must be fundamental differences in labor market opportunities for blacks and whites as well 
as the structure of their offers for risky jobs” pg. 254.  For non-fatal injury both men and women earn a wage differential 
but this figure is three times larger for women.  Leeth and Ruser (2003) also show that white women earn the highest 
wage compensation for non-fatal risk.  Black, Hispanic and other minorities also receive higher pay for bearing nonfatal 
injury risk but the premia were smaller than for white women. 
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distribution of workers is accounted for they find there is no premium for males but do find that 
men and women in blue-collar jobs earn a premium that does not exist for white-collar jobs. 7 
 
The existence of inter-industry wage differentials is a further obstacle to the estimation of an industry 
level pollution-wage premia.  Failing to control for other sources of industry wage premia would bias 
the results.  Broadly speaking, blue-collar workers in mining; construction; manufacturing; and 
transportation receive relatively high wages while those in wholesale; retail; finance; and services, 
receive lower wages (Leigh 1995).  The inter-industry wage literature has provided many explanations 
for the persistence of pay differentials.  Brown and Medoff (1989) for example demonstrate that, 
ceteris paribus, larger employers will pay higher wages.  Other explanations for inter-industry wage 
differentials include compensating for the likelihood of sectoral unemployment (Murphy and Topel 
1987), regional unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994), union power or segmented markets 
(Dickens and Katz 1987) or industry shocks that persist over many years due to labor immobility or 
                                               
7 A related issue is the controversy surrounding unobservable worker heterogeneity and VSL estimates.  One recognised 
problem with all wage-risk studies is the issue of endogeneity, as raised by Garen (1988).  It is possible that those workers 
with the greatest earnings capacity are likely to choose safer and less pollution intensive working environments (assuming 
safety and pollution-free working conditions are normal goods).  After attempting to control for endogenity issues, 
Garen (1988) finds generally larger VSL estimates. However, as Kostiuk (1990) points out, Garen’s (1988) methodology 
removes unobserved worker heterogeneity as an influence on the estimates.  This is fine if the unobserved heterogeneity 
is the behaviour of workers in the face of risk alone.  However, differing risk parameters across workers are a necessary 
condition for the market to generate compensating wage differentials unless we assume individuals’ indifference curves 
are identical.  The Garen technique therefore removes too much. Nevertheless, we utilise the Garen methodology to 
control for the possible endogenity of our fatal, nonfatal and pollution risk variables.  The coefficient on nonfatal risk did 
not alter significantly and remained insignificant and had little impact on the pollution risk coefficient.  We are unable to 
instrument for possible endogeneity between wages and pollution intensity as no suitable instruments is available.  
Results when fatal and nonfatal risk are instrumented are available from the authors upon request. 
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a larger proportion of experienced or tenured workers in particular industries (Helwege 1992).  
Finally, numerous studies argue that highly unionised industries have a greater opportunity to 
influence wage decisions (and working conditions).  See Duncan and Stafford (1980) and Viscusi and 
Aldy (2003) for a review of the trade union effect. 
 
Within the inter-industry wage differential literature there is still considerable debate about the extent 
to which unobserved individual heterogeneity is responsible for inter-industry wage differentials (see 
e.g. Blackburn and Neumark 1992 and Gibbons and Katz 1995).  Hence, individual level 
characteristics are often included to control for individual heterogeneity.  The individual controls are 
generally the same as those in the VSL literature.8 
 
Wherever possible, we try to overcome the obstacles outlined above. To minimise the possibility of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting wages we control for a wide range of individual 
characteristics when estimating wages, as discussed below. Similarly, the inclusion of industry-level 
dummies allows us to control for inter-industry wage differentials.  
 
Whether or not workers are compensated ex post for the risks that they face and whether or not they 
are actually aware of these risks is an empirical question that further motivates our study. The fact 
that we find such premia to exist suggests that workers are at least partially aware of the risks that 
they are exposed to and, furthermore, they are not fully compensated for them ex post. 
 
 
                                               
8 Dickens and Katz (1987) find that roughly a quarter of individual level wage variation is explained by industry level 
wage premia casting doubt on the ability of unmeasured worker heterogeneity to account for industry wage differentials. 
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2. Methodology and Data 
 
In any econometric analysis of compensating wage differentials it is important to be aware that the 
raw data tends to show a correlation between risk (however measured) and lower wages (Robinson 
1991).  Therefore, evidence of wage compensation is dependent on the econometric specification. 
 
In this paper we go to considerable lengths to ensure that we identify the relationship between risk 
(exposure to pollution and fatal and nonfatal injury) and wages.  We use economic theory and 
previous empirical studies to justify our choice of explanatory variables. 
 
Assume individual i has a choice of employment from a range of different possibilities and that each 
choice offers different probabilities of job related ill health either through fatal and nonfatal injury or 
the existence of numerous pollutants known to be detrimental to health.  Let fjt, rjt and pjt represent 
the probability of fatal, non-fatal and pollution related risk for a particular job respectively.  In order 
to examine the impact of our risk variables on wage rates we estimate a semi-log wage equation (1): 
 
itjtjtjtit Xrfpw  
'
3210ln       (1) 
 
where wit denotes the wage of individual i in year t, pjt represents pollution exposure (defined below) 
in industry j, fjt and rjt represents fatal and nonfatal risk in industry j in year t respectively and X is a 
vector of other determinants of wages that includes industry and individual level characteristics.  εit is 
the error term. 
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Pollution exposure p is trying to capture the degree of pollution exposure that an individual is 
subjected to in the workplace.  We utilise industry-level emissions of 21 different pollutants which 
we weight according to toxicity and aggregate into four broad groups.  Throughout this paper we 
employ industry definitions used by the UK Environmental Accounts (EA).  The EA categorisation 
is based on the Standard Industrial Classification 1992 (SIC92).  Our 81 industries provide coverage 
for all sectors of the economy.  In all we have six primary industries, 39 secondary and 33 service 
industries.  See Table 4 in the Appendix for a list of industries included in our sample.  We believe 
this provides a comprehensive and representative cross-section of the UK economy.  We 
acknowledge the existence of aggregation issues because of our industry level measures where the 
ideal measure of pollution exposure would be at the plant level but our choice is as disaggregated as 
possible given the data constraints.9 
 
In order to weight by toxicity we use the Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) reported in the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) publication ‘2004 Threshold Limit 
Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents’.  As Brooks and Sethi (1997) clarify, a TLV is 
the maximum airborne concentration of a substance to which a worker may be repeatedly exposed 
for an eight-hour workday and 40 hour working week without suffering adverse health effects.  Of 
our 21 pollutants, CO2 has the highest TLV at 9,000 mg/m
3 while arsenic has the lowest TLV at 0.01 
mg/m3.  Having weighted each pollutant by its TLV we then aggregate the 21 weighted pollutants 
into four groups, namely: (i) all 21 pollutants; (ii) heavy metals; (iii) traditional local air pollutants; and 
(iv) other pollutants (all non-heavy metals).  See Table 5 in the Appendix for details. 
 
                                               
9 The UK Environmental Accounts (EA) use a combination of 2, 3 and 4-digit SIC codes.  See 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/.   
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We construct a proxy of individual exposure of working in firm f in industry j at time t denoted as 
EXPfjt.  We provide three alternative measures of EXPfjt for each of our four pollutant groups where 
“emissions” are either total pollution, heavy metals, local pollutants or other pollutants.  We describe 
each exposure measure and explain under which assumptions each proxy is an appropriate measure 
of exposure risk. 
 
Measure 1, which we call ‘Pollution’, is simply defined as emissions in industry j. 
 
 jtfjt EMISSIONSEXPOSURE Pollution       (2) 
 
Pollution would be a reasonable proxy of the pollution exposure from working in firm f at time t, if all 
industries have the same number of firms. 
 
Measure 2, ‘Pollution per unit of value added’ is defined as total emissions in industry j scaled by gross 
value added (GVA) in industry j. 
 

jt
jt
fjt
GVA
EMISSIONS
EXPOSURE Pollution per unit of value added    (3) 
 
Pollution per unit of value added  would be a reasonable proxy of the pollution exposure from working in 
firm f at time t, if all firms in industry j have the same level of GVA. 
 
Measure 3, ‘Pollution per firm’ is defined as total emissions in industry j scaled by the number of firms 
in industry j. 
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
jt
jt
fjt
FIRMSNo
EMISSIONS
EXPOSURE
.
Pollution per firm      (4) 
 
Pollution per firm would be a reasonable proxy of the pollution exposure from working in firm f at time 
t if all industries have firms of the same size.  We are unfortunately unable to ascertain which of our 
measures forms the most accurate measure of exposure.  For that reason, and as part of our 
sensitivity analysis, all three measures are tested for each of our four pollution groupings.  It is easy 
to think of reasons why industry level emissions, however measured, are not accurate measures of 
exposure.  For example, if pollution is emitted from a high chimney it is possible that local residents 
would suffer more from the fallout that those employed in the factory.  Likewise, plant location or 
industrial clustering may have a significant affect on exposure levels not captured by our variables. 
However, if pollution affects the local community wages may still reflect the demands of the local 
population who work in the polluting factory.10 
 
Our individual-level characteristics are obtained from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). 
We use micro data for male and female manual workers taken from the QLFS for 1995-2003.11  The 
main advantage of the QLFS is that it contains a wealth of information on the employment and 
                                               
10 In unreported results we also use a fourth exposure measure, namely pollution per worker. Results were broadly similar 
to those for the other exposure measures but are omitted for reasons of space. They are available upon request.  
11 The QLFS is a rotating panel that follows the same individuals for five consecutive quarters.  It currently includes a 
representative sample of approximately 60,000 households made up of five “waves”, each of approximately 12,000 
households.  A systematic random sample design is used for the survey and it is therefore representative of the whole of 
Great Britain.  All estimates based on the LFS are subject to sampling error.  Our sample excludes the self-employed.  
Care is taken to ensure that individuals are not replicated. 
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socio-economic characteristics of individuals.  Our fatal and non-fatal data are from the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE).  This approach to deriving an incidence rate of injury is described in a 
special feature of the Employment Gazette (December 1992) by Stevens (1992).  Our sample size is 
approximately 53,000 individuals.  Our dependent variable is the log of wages and is measured as an 
individual’s weekly wage.  Estimates with hourly wages give broadly similar results.12 
 
The main results in this paper are derived from a sample of male and female manual workers. Costa 
and Kahn (2004) consider only male production workers between the age of 18 to 45 (or prime aged 
males) who they argue are the individuals that are likely to be the most sensitive to risk (Viscusi and 
Aldy 2003).  In our sensitivity analysis we therefore estimate our results for males only and for both 
production and non-production workers.  Results are available upon request.13 
 
A final issue is the possibility of selection bias as a result of assigning average industry (or 
occupation) risk to individual workers (Lipsey 1976).  Note that a statistically significant positive 
coefficient on any pollution variable represents a wage premium captured by the employee for 
working in a dirty industry.  It is therefore an industry wage premium that is shared by all workers in 
that industry whatever their (unobservable) level of individual risk.  For example, shop floor workers 
in a chemical plant are assumed to have the same risk premium as secretaries working in the offices 
                                               
12 The difference between weekly pay and hourly pay is that the former includes usual hours of paid overtime. 
13 Bellman (1994) uses occupational risk variables for blue-collar workers for Germany and finds a significant positive 
effect for non-fatal occupational illness of male employees, controlling for schooling, experience and change of industry.  
However, for nonfatal injuries at work the coefficient was significant and negative.  He concluded that for Germany 
there was no explicit evidence for the existence of compensating wage differentials, especially for non-fatal risk.  In 
contrast, Grund (2000) finds evidence of compensating wage differentials for increased accidents for blue-collar workers 
in West Germany. 
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possibly away from the source of the pollution or injury risk.  Many previous studies in this area 
merge industry or occupation level fatal and non-fatal injury risks to individual workers (with some 
exceptions such as Duncan and Holmlund (1983) and Viscusi (2004)).  The attribution of average 
measured risk to individuals may be inexact because categorical risk is likely to be mis-measured and 
imperfectly correlated with individual risk.  We attempt to minimise this potential problem by 
concentrating on manual workers.14 
 
Returning to equation (1), alongside pollution exposure, vector X contains a large number of 
individual-level and industry-level explanatory variables motivated by the inter-industry wage 
differential literature.  To account for the effect of industry and occupational dummies discussed by 
Dillingham (1985) and Leigh (1995), we include a broad occupation dummy and sector dummies.  
This allows us to take account of the important inter-industry wage effect.  We also include firm size 
following Brown and Medoff (1989), unemployment rates by region (Blanchflower and Oswald 
1994), union power or segmented markets (Dickens and Katz 1987), industry growth and industry 
size (Helwege 1992) and the capital intensity of an industry.15  Because applying industry-averaged 
data to individuals reduces the number of truly independent variables we cluster our standard errors 
by our industry classification to adjust the standard errors for unobserved industry attributes 
(Moulton 1990). 
 
                                               
14 The majority of studies are US based and merge industry-average risk measures (BLS at 2 or 3-digit) or the NIOSH’s 
National Traumatic Occupational Fatality project which reports fatalities by 1-digit industry.  Seven of the eight studies 
summarised in Droman and Hagstrom (1998) use these data sets. 
15 Import and export variables are not included as our sample has both tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
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To account for as much unobserved individual heterogeneity as possible we include a range of 
individual level characteristics.  For example, following Leeth and Ruser (2003) we include sex, a 
foreign born dummy and ethnic dummies as well as the standard human capital controls for an 
individual level wage equation such as region of residence, qualifications, age, marital status, tenure, 
and a measure of general health.  Whether or not an individual is a homeowner was initially included 
but dropped due to the standard endogenity concerns.  The positive sign and significance was as 
expected and the results for other variables do not change. We also split ethnicity into 9 groups: 
White; Black Caribbean; Black African; Black Other; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese; and 
Other ethnic and include 11 UK regions: North; Yorkshire; North West; East Midlands; West 
Midlands; East-Anglia; South East; South West; Wales; Scotland; and Northern-Ireland.  To address 
the productivity issues of Hwang et al. (1992) and Shogren and Stamland (2002) we include five 
different levels of qualifications to proxy unobservable productivity or skills namely: a degree; A-
levels; O-levels; other qualifications; and no qualifications. Finally to control for other potentially 
undesirable job attributes we include a dummies for shift-working, evening work and night work. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Our results stems from estimates of equation (1) for our three alternative exposure measures and 
four different pollutant groups.  In Table 1 we report the OLS coefficients on our pollution, fatal 
and nonfatal risk variables for each of the twelve individual specifications. Table 1 also reports the 
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coefficients on pollution from a base specification where fatal and nonfatal risk are omitted, again for 
the twelve different specifications. 16 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In line with the previous VSL literature we find a significant and positive coefficient on fatal risk that 
is fairly constant across pollutants and pollution risk variables.  When we calculate the VSL based on 
an average wage of £11,460 and 2000 prices the estimates range between £12 million and £19 
million (US$17.8 and US$28.1 at an average year 2000 exchange rate of 1.48).  This range is 
considerably higher than US estimates but is more consistent with previous UK studies. For 
example, again using 2000 prices, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) estimate a UK VSL of $19.9 
million, Sandy et al. (2001) estimate a UK VSL range of $5.7 million to $74.1 million and Siebert and 
Wei (1994) estimate a UK VSL range of $9.4 million to $11.5 million.17  Our coefficient on non-fatal 
risk is insignificant and remains so even if we drop fatal risk.   
 
An examination of the coefficient on the exposure risk variable reveals that it is positive in all twelve 
regressions and significant in six of them.  When pollution risk is scaled by value added it is positive 
and significant in three out of four regressions.  Comparing the results with and without the 
inclusion of fatal and non-fatal risk we can see that the statistical significance of the pollution 
exposure risk variables is unaffected by the inclusion of fatal and non-fatal risk. However, it can be 
seen that the magnitude of the pollution coefficient is generally larger in the models that exclude fatal 
and non-fatal risk, suggesting some correlation between pollution risk and other forms of risk. In 
                                               
16 Appenidix 3 contains the sample means of all of the variables used in Table 1. 
17 None of these UK studies use our richer LFS dataset. 
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principle the overlap between pollution risk and fatal and non-fatal injuries should be minimal since 
the latter measures relate to workplace accidents, the vast majority of which would be unrelated to 
industrial pollution exposure. In contrast, the pollution risk measures are capturing longer term 
health risks. 
 
The coefficients and significance of the other explanatory variables are broadly as expected.  Full 
specification results for All Pollutants for pollution per unit of value added, pollution per firm and pollution, 
respectively are provided in Table 7 in the Appendix.  For reasons of space we do not report full 
results for Heavy Metals, Local Air and Other Pollutants, these are available on request.  The default 
individual is native born; white; male; no qualifications; lives in the South West; works in the 
agricultural industry, does not work any type of unsociable hours and is a non-manager.  The 
following are broadly negative and significant determinants of wages: female; age squared; health and 
the majority of our measures of ethnicity.  Regional unemployment; physical capital intensity (non-
wage value added) and growth in gross value added (industry growth) are generally negative and 
insignificant.  Broadly positive and significant determinants of wages are: union density; GVA; the 
size of the firm; sectoral unemployment; individual age; qualifications; whether foreign born; whether 
married; whether working in the manufacturing sector.  These results are generally as expected 
(except perhaps the sectoral unemployment rate) and are similar to the majority of compensating 
wage differential studies. 
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3.1 Calculating Weekly Wage Premia 
 
We now seek to calculate weekly wage premia associated with working within the five most pollution 
intensive industries. In order to do this we firstly rank industries in terms of the three exposure 
measures (for ‘all pollutants’) and then add the three rankings. Industries are then ranked again in 
terms of this sum of rankings and from this we identify the 5 most pollution intensive industries. We 
create dummy variables for these 5 industries and interact them with our pollution variables and 
include them in equation (1) alongside our main pollution variables. This allows us to identify 
whether the impact of pollution on wages is higher in these industries than across industries overall. 
In turn, this allows us to estimate weekly wage premia for these industries. Table 2 presents the 
estimated coefficients on the interactions between dummy variables for the 5 dirtiest industries and 
pollution variables. We also report the coefficients on fatal and non-fatal risk (all other coefficients 
are omitted for reasons of space). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents actual industry level wage premia for our five dirtiest industries in monetary terms.  
We present the actual weekly wage premium in pounds sterling and the percentage of the weekly 
wage that this constitutes. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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For pollution, if we exclude the Extraction of Oil and Gas (SIC11+12) and SIC (23), that may have 
large premia for reasons not controlled for in this paper such as unsociable working conditions, the 
largest wage premia in percentage terms are around 15% for Other Organic Basic Chemicals 
(SIC2414) and Other Inorganic chemicals (SIC2413).  In absolute terms this translates into an 
increase in the weekly wage of around £50.  The remarkably small differences across pollution 
exposure measures in terms of magnitude or ranking of industries gives us confidence that our three 
proxies are capturing an element of an individual’s pollution exposure albeit indirectly. 
 
Table 3 also provides fatal risk premia, allowing a comparison with pollution premia. Across all 81 
industries, the average weekly fatal risk premium ranges from £1.30 to £1.50 (0.54% to 0.63%). The 
equivalent figures for pollution premia are £0.20 to £0.80 (0.1% to 0.4%) across all 81 industries. 
Converting to annual figures and multiplying by the total manufacturing labour force of 3,264,343 
(2003), provides total annual fatal risk compensation of between £220.7 million and £254.6 million 
and total annual pollution risk compensation of between £33.9 million and £135.8 million. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The compensating wage literature is well established and numerous papers investigate both the 
causes of inter-industry wage differentials and how these differentials, applied to fatal and nonfatal 
risk, can be used to estimate the VSL.  In this paper we investigate, for the first time, whether an 
industry’s level of pollution emissions weighted by toxicity is sufficient to generate a wage premium 
for working in a dirty industry.  
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Although theoretically and intuitively plausible, we discuss numerous empirical and theoretical 
arguments as to why exposure to pollution may not be translated into greater wage demands and 
hence a wage premium.  After taking care to fully specify our econometric model in light of these 
arguments our results provide wage premia estimates of one half of one percent across all sectors of 
the economy although this rose to an average of approximately 15% for workers in one of the five 
dirtiest industries.  Our estimates of the VSL for the UK range between £12 and £19m in 2000 
prices.  These are consistent with previous UK studies although they are more than double the 
accepted US estimates.  We believe one reason is because the risk of a fatal injury at work is 
significantly lower in the UK than other countries that have been subject to VSL studies. 
 
The policy implications are clear.  Although a reduction in exposure need not have an impact on 
productivity and efficiency per se, an increase in pollution abatement by UK companies should lead to 
an improvement in working conditions and thus lower levels of sickness absence, reductions in 
compensation payments etc.  Along these lines it would be interesting to extend the analysis in this 
paper to investigate the relationship between industry emissions and the incidence of ill-health or 
sickness absence.  Following the initial work of this paper it might also be useful in future work to 
determine which type of emissions correspond better to actual exposure and estimate with those 
emissions only.  This will require a much greater understanding of the health literature. 
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Table 1: OLS estimates of the impact of pollution and risk on (log) wages of manual workers 
(estimated coefficients). 
  Pollution per unit 
 of value added 
Pollution  
per firm 
Pollution 
  Base Full Base Full Base Full 
All 
Pollutants 
Pollution 2.26* 
(1.207) 
1.87** 
(1.124) 
89.823*** 
(32.76) 
59.53 
(37.08) 
0.267 
(0.169) 
0.114 
(0.184) 
Fatal Risk - 0.012** 
(0.0064) 
- 0.0133** 
(0.006) 
- 0.014** 
(0.0067) 
Non-Fatal 
Risk 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00012 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
R-squared 0.4318 0.4323 0.4315 0.4320 0.4314 0.4320 
Heavy 
Metals 
Pollution 27.17 
(16.36) 
26.521 
(16.56) 
6910.71*** 
(1363.44) 
6,658.1*** 
(1,616.6) 
8.804 
(6.072) 
7.494 
(6.901) 
Fatal Risk - 0.0139** 
(0.0059) 
- 0.0135** 
(0.0057) 
- 0.0129** 
(0.0064) 
Non-Fatal 
Risk 
- -0.00014 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00012 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00014 
(0.00012) 
R-squared 0.4320 0.4327 0.4327 0.4333 0.4317 0.4322 
Local Air Pollution 2.407* 
(1.259) 
1.946* 
(1.117) 
89.11*** 
(29.28) 
56.32* 
(33.427) 
0.258 
(0.175) 
0.0884 
(0.185) 
Fatal Risk - 0.0126* 
(0.0064) 
- 0.0135** 
(0.0065) 
- 0.0142** 
(0.0067) 
Non-Fatal 
Risk 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00012 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
R-squared 0.4317 0.4322 0.4314 0.4320 0.4313 0.4319 
Other 
Pollution 
Pollution 2.395* 
(1.217) 
1.937* 
(1.109) 
86.209** 
(28.52) 
54.81* 
(32.74) 
0.258 
(0.165) 
0.0959 
(0.177) 
Fatal Risk - 0.0123* 
(0.0064) 
- 0.0134** 
(0.0065) 
- 0.0141** 
(0.0068) 
Non-Fatal 
Risk 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00012 
(0.00012) 
- -0.00013 
(0.00012) 
R-squared 0.4318 0.4323 0.4315 0.4320 0.4313 0.4319 
 Observations 52894 52894 52894 
The base model contains a full set of controls but excludes fatal and non-fatal risk. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
The risk coefficients are based on a denominator of 100,000 workers.   
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the impact of pollution on (log) wages in the top five dirty industries  
(all pollutants only, estimated coefficients and standard errors) 
  
Pollution per unit  
of value added 
 
 
Pollution  
per firm 
 
Pollution 
 
Total  0.591**      (0.273) 24.37             (16.79) -0.113         (0.147) 
Extraction of Petrol & Gas (SIC11 +12) 226.88***   (26.10) 21,417.9***   (2,554.9) 16.910***   (1.781) 
Coke ovens, refined petrol & nuclear (SIC23) 14.32***     (0.849) 1,742.5***     (94.35) 6.867***     (0.411) 
Structural Clay Products (SIC264) 6.048***     (1.605) 4,429.78***   (1,067.3) 18.76***     (4.440) 
Other Inorganic Chemicals (SIC2413) 16.767***   (3.033) 10,975.3***   (2,022.31) 38.54***     (7.220) 
Other Organic Basic Chemicals (SIC2414) 23.60***     (3.86) 2,905.6***     (477.56) 17.65***     (2.880) 
Fatal Risk 0.0194***   (0.005) 0.0194***      (0.005) 0.021***     (0.005) 
Non-Fatal Risk -0.0002       (0.0001) -0.0001          (0.0001) -0.0002       (0.0001) 
Observations 52894 52894 52894 
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. Results for heavy metals, local air pollution and other 
pollution are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 3: Wage premia in dirty industries (Pounds £ per week and as a percentage of the average 
weekly wage in each industry) 
 Pollution per 
unit of value 
added 
% Pollution per 
firm 
 
 
% Pollution 
 
 
 
 
% 
SIC11+12 118.2 28.2 119.2 28.4 125.9 30.0 
SIC23 87.5 24.5 87.4 24.5 93.9 26.3 
SIC264 15.6 5.9 17.2 6.5 17.4 6.6 
SIC2413 49.2 16.5 45.1 15.1 50.2 16.8 
SIC2414 51.3 15.2 43.8 13.0 51.1 15.1 
Ave. for all 81 
industries 
0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Fatal risk 
premium 
Ave. for all 81 
industries 
1.3 0.54 1.4 0.60 1.5 0.63 
This table calculates how much lower fitted wages would be in these industries if pollution were equal to zero.  Wage 
premia based upon the level of wages if pollution were equal to the median level of pollution across all industries are very 
similar to these, reflecting the fact that the median level of pollution is very low and hence close to zero. Wage premia 
calculated using the mean-level of pollution across industries are, inevitably, smaller and are available upon request.  The 
final row of the table calculates how much lower fitted wages would be in these industries if fatal risk were equal to zero  
(it differs across exposure measure only because the estimated coefficient on fatal risk differs slightly in each model). 
 33 
Table 4: UK Environment Agency Industry Classification and SIC92 concordance 
SIC92 Description SIC92 Description 
1 Agriculture 32 Radio, television and comms. 
2 Forestry 33 Medical, precision, optical inst. 
5 Fishing 34 Motor vehicles and trailers 
10 Mining of coal 35 Other transport equipment 
11+12 Extraction of petrol and gas 36+37 Manufacture of other products 
13 Mining of metal ores 40.1 Electricity production 
14 Other mining 40.2+40.3 Gas distribution 
15 Food and beverages 41 Water supply 
16 Tobacco products 45 Construction 
17 Textiles 50 Garages, car showrooms 
18 Clothing manufacture 51 Wholesale trade not motor 
vehicles 
19 Leather, luggage & footwear 52 Retail & repair except motor 
20 Timber  55 Hotels and restaurants 
21 Pulp and paper 60.1 Railways 
22 Publishing and printing 60.2+60.3 Buses and coaches 
23 Coke oven, refined petrol & 
nuclear 
60.2+60.3 Tubes and trams 
24.11+24.12 Industrial gases, dyes, pigments 60.2+60.3 Taxis operation 
24.13 Other inorganic chemicals 60.2+60.3 Freight transport by road 
24.14 Other organic basic chemicals 60.2+60.3 Transport via pipeline 
24.15 Fertilisers, nitrogen compounds 61 Water transport 
24.16+24.17 Plastics and synthetic rubber 62 Air transport 
24.2 Pesticides, agro-chemicals 63 Supporting transport activities 
24.3 Paints, varnishes, ink etc 64.1+64.2 Post and telecommunications 
24.4 Pharmaceuticals 65 Financial intermediation 
24.5 Soap and detergents 66 Insurance and pensions 
24.6 Chemical products n.e.s 67 Auxiliary finance activities 
24.7 Man-made fibres 70.1+70.2+70.3 Real estate activities 
25.1 Rubber products 71 Renting of machinery 
25.2 Plastic products 72 Computer and related activities 
26.1 Glass and glass products 73 Research and development 
26.2+26.3 Ceramic goods 74 Other business activities 
26.4 Structural clay products 75 public admininstration 
26.5 Cement, lime and plaster 80 Education 
26.6+26.7+26.8 Concrete, stone etc 85 Health and vet services, social 
work 
27.1+27.2+27.3 Iron and steel 90 sewage and waste 
27.4 Non-ferrous metals 91 Activities of membership orgs. 
27.5 Casting of metals 92 Recreation and sporting activities 
28 Fabricated metal products 93 Other service activities 
29 Machinery & equipment 95 Private households 
30 Office machinery, computers   
31 Electrical machinery & 
apparatus 
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Table 5: Pollutants Groupings 
All  
Pollutants 
Heavy 
Metals 
Local  
Air 
Other Pollutants 
(all non-heavy metals) 
Sulphur Dioxide  Sulphur Dioxide Sulphur Dioxide 
Nitrogen Oxides  Nitrogen Oxides Nitrogen Oxides 
Ammonia  Ammonia Ammonia 
Carbon Monoxide  Carbon Monoxide Carbon Monoxide 
Particulate Matter 
(pm10) 
 Particulate Matter 
(pm10) 
Particulate Matter 
(pm10)  
Non-methane Volatile 
Organic Compounds  
 Non-methane Volatile 
Organic Compounds 
Non-methane Volatile 
Organic Compounds  
Benzene   Benzene 
Butadiene   Butadiene 
Lead Lead   
Cadmium Cadmium   
Arsenic Arsenic   
Mercury Mercury   
Copper Copper   
Chromium Chromium   
Nickel Nickel   
Selenium Selenium   
Vanadium Vanadium   
Zinc Zinc   
Carbon Dioxide   Carbon Dioxide 
Methane   Methane 
Nitrous Oxides   Nitrous Oxides 
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Table 6. Table of Sample Means.  
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Gross Weekly Pay 240.85 114.71 FemaleA 0.21 0.41 
Total Emissions (Pollution) see eq’n (2) 0.01 0.03 Foreign BornA 0.05 0.22 
Emissions/GVA (Pollution per unit of value 
added) see eq’n (3) 0.001 0.005 
WhiteA 0.96 0.18 
Emissions/ No Firms (Pollution per firm) see 
eq’n (4) 0.00001 0.0001 
Black CaribbeanA 0.01 0.09 
Fatal Risk (industry level fatalities per 
100,000 workers) 
1.57 1.91 Black AfricanA 0.003 0.05 
Non-Fatal Risk (industry level non-fatal 
injuries per 100,000 workers) 
184.35 119.16 Black OtherA 0.001 0.03 
Poor HealthA  0.08 0.27 IndianA 0.01 0.11 
Union MemberA 0.37 0.48 PakistaniA 0.004 0.06 
Worked for Firm>5 yrsA 0.47 0.50 BangladeshiA 0.001 0.03 
Shift WorkA 0.30 0.46 ChineseA 0.001 0.03 
Evening WorkA 0.17 0.38 Other Non-WhiteA 0.01 0.08 
Night WorkA 0.20 0.40 MarriedA 0.62 0.49 
Growth GVA -0.75 10.69 Observed in 1996A 0.17 0.37 
PCI 0.75 0.08 Observed in 1997A 0.16 0.37 
Firm Size  0.56 0.28 Observed in 1998A 0.16 0.37 
AgricultureA 0.0003 0.02 Observed in 1999A 0.16 0.36 
FishingA 0.0001 0.01 Observed in 2000A 0.14 0.35 
MiningA 0.01 0.09 Observed in 2001A 0.11 0.31 
ManufacturingA 0.41 0.49 Observed in 2002A 0.10 0.30 
UtilitiesA 0.01 0.10 NorthA 0.07 0.25 
ConstructionA 0.11 0.31 YorkshireA 0.10 0.30 
Wholesale & RetailA 0.11 0.32 North WestA 0.10 0.30 
Hotels and RestaurantsA 0.04 0.19 East MidlandsA 0.09 0.28 
Transport & CommsA 0.13 0.33 West MidlandsA 0.11 0.31 
Real Estate & BusinessA 0.05 0.21 East AngliaA 0.04 0.20 
EducationA 0.03 0.18 South EastA 0.23 0.42 
Health & Social WorkA 0.06 0.24 South WestA 0.08 0.27 
Other SectorA 0.04 0.21 WalesA 0.05 0.22 
Age  39 12.14 ScotlandA 0.10 0.30 
Degree as Highest QualA 0.05 0.23 Northern IrelandA 0.03 0.17 
Al evel as Highest QualA 0.39 0.49 Regional U Rate 0.09 0.02 
O level as Highest QualA 0.15 0.36 ManagerA 0.00002 0.004 
Other as Highest QualA 0.21 0.40 N 52894  
No QualificationsA 0.80 0.38    
A denotes a 0/1 dichotomous dummy variable.   SD refers to the standard deviation.  Equivalent full specification results 
for heavy metals, local air, and other pollution are available on request. 
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Table 7: OLS (log) Wage equation for all pollutants, full specification (1995-2003) 
  
Pollution per unit of 
value added 
 
Pollution  
per firm 
 
Pollution 
 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Emissions 1.875 1.124 59.536 37.089 0.114 0.185 
Fatal Risk 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.014 0.007 
Non-Fatal Risk -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
Health -0.085 0.006 -0.085 0.006 -0.085 0.006 
Union 0.101 0.009 0.101 0.009 0.101 0.009 
Tenure 0.086 0.014 0.086 0.014 0.087 0.014 
Shift work 0.078 0.011 0.078 0.011 0.078 0.011 
Evening work 0.026 0.005 0.026 0.005 0.026 0.005 
Night work 0.099 0.005 0.099 0.005 0.099 0.005 
Industry growth 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0004 
PCI 0.144 0.100 0.136 0.100 0.138 0.100 
Firm Size 0.141 0.043 0.139 0.042 0.144 0.043 
Age 0.057 0.007 0.057 0.007 0.057 0.007 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 
Degree 0.293 0.015 0.294 0.015 0.294 0.015 
A level 0.168 0.007 0.168 0.007 0.168 0.007 
O level 0.074 0.011 0.074 0.011 0.074 0.011 
Other Qualification 0.046 0.007 0.046 0.007 0.046 0.007 
Female -0.284 0.011 -0.284 0.011 -0.284 0.011 
Foreign Born 0.026 0.010 0.026 0.010 0.026 0.010 
Black Caribbean -0.044 0.018 -0.044 0.018 -0.044 0.018 
Black African  -0.102 0.044 -0.102 0.044 -0.102 0.044 
Black Other  0.072 0.054 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.054 
Indian -0.150 0.020 -0.150 0.020 -0.150 0.020 
Pakistani  -0.210 0.030 -0.210 0.030 -0.210 0.030 
Bangladeshi  -0.532 0.098 -0.532 0.098 -0.532 0.098 
Chinese  -0.127 0.059 -0.127 0.059 -0.127 0.059 
Other ethnic -0.047 0.021 -0.047 0.021 -0.047 0.021 
Married 0.054 0.006 0.054 0.006 0.054 0.006 
Unemployment Rate 0.512 0.384 0.511 0.385 0.513 0.385 
Manager dummy 0.760 0.022 0.758 0.022 0.756 0.022 
Constant -0.069 0.143 -0.069 0.143 -0.073 0.143 
Region dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 0.432 0.432 0.432 
N 52894 52894 52894 
 
The default individual in our regressions is native born; white; male; that has no qualifications; lives in the South West; 
works in the agricultural industry, does not work any type of unsociable hours and is a non-manager. 
